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Editor: Karen L. Hooks, The Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2Y2
Quality control over the practice 
of publicaccounting isa major issue 
for the profession today. Further, it 
is likely that quality control will under­
go change based on the results of 
two outstanding sets of proposals. 
One proposal comes from the An­




The Anderson Committee Report 
(AICPA) was released in 1986. This 
report offers various recommenda­
tions, including not only changes in 
practice monitoring, but also modi­
fications in the Code of Professional 
Conduct, a restructured Joint Trial 
Board, a 120-hour continuing pro­
fessional education requirement 
(over each three-year period) for 
members in public practice, a 90- 
hour continuing professional edu­
cation requirement (over each three- 
year period) for members not in. 
public practice and not in retire­
ment, and a post baccalaureate edu­
cation requirement beginning in the 
year 2000. Each of the Anderson 
Committee proposals is being voted 
on separately by the AICPA mem­
bership, and the voting is expected 
to be completed by the end of the 
year.
The Anderson Committee Report 
presents various recommendations 
for practice monitoring or peer re­
view, to be called quality review. 
First, all firms in public practice that 
have personnel who are members of 
the AICPA must participate in the 
SEC Practice Section (SECPS), the 
Private Companies Practice Sec­
tion (PCPS) or a Quality Review 
program. Another Anderson Com­
mittee recommendation, which was 
rejected by a vote of the AICPA 
membership in the spring of 1987, 
was for all firms that audit one or 
more SEC registrants to be members 
of the SECPS. The consequences of 
a firm’s not being a member of the 
SECPS was to be that the CPAs 
working forthatfirm would not qual­
ify for AICPA membership. Shortly 
after this AICPA membership rejec­
tion, the SEC proposed rule changes 
which require peer review for audi­
tors of SEC registrants. The SEC 
proposal will be discussed later.
The Quality Review program, still 
to be considered by the AICPA, 
would be structured similarly to the 
peer review programs of the prac­
tice sections. It would require trien­
nial reviews. Reviews would be struc­
tured and conducted appropriately 
for the size and type of practice of 
the CPA firm, taking into considera­
tion the formality of the firm’s inter­
nal quality control system and the 
extent of its auditing and account­
ing practice. Results of the quality 
review would be monitored. Docu­
ments placed in files would be open 
to the public and would be the same 
as those filed at the close of a prac­
tice section review. Reviewed firms 
would pay the cost of the review and 
direct administrative costs.
The quality review must result in 
an unqualified, a qualified or an 
adverse report. The report would be 
examined by a subcommittee of the 
Quality Review Committee. Then, 
the entire committee would act on 
any recommendations of the sub­
committee. Actions resulting from 
an adverse quality review report 
might include: requiring education­
al, corrective or remedial measures; 
referring complaints to the AICPA 
Professional Ethics Committee or to 
state CPA societies’ ethics commit­
tees; and imposing sanctions if defi­
ciencies are not corrected. The recom­
mended structure of the Quality Re­
view program would utilize the state 
CPA societies, as well as the AICPA, 
to administer the program.
An AICPA Quality Review Com­
mittee would set standards, organ­
ize or oversee quality reviews, ana­
lyze results, and recommend follow­
up action. If the state societies agree 
to set up state level quality review 
committees, those committees 
would also organize or oversee re­
views. These state committees would 
be required to coordinate with the 
national-level AICPA Quality Review 
Committee and adhere to its stan­
dards.
In the proposed Quality Review 
program, there are changes in the 
responsibility for investigating com­
plaints about technical competence. 
The Quality Review Committee and 
practice sections peer review com­
mittees would investigate com­
plaints against members and firms. 
The Quality Review Executive Com­
mittee would be responsible for ac­
tion against firms that do not coop­
erate or that commit serious viola­
tions of technical competence. Ac­
tion by the Executive Committee 
can result in denial of membership 
in the Quality Review program. The 
Quality Review program would estab­
lish due process procedures similar 
to those of the SECPS and PCPS for 
action against firms.
In summary, the Quality Review 
program envisioned by the Ander­
son Committee would be a structure 
for uniform peer review for those 
AICPA members in firms choosing 
not to join the SECPS or PCPS. Its 
structure and activities largely paral­
lel those of the practice sections, 
with the exception of working with 
state CPA societies. One other major 
difference of the revamped program 
is that initially it would address only 
accounting and auditing engage­
ments. Eventually, however, all areas 
of practice would be encompassed.
SEC Proposal
The SEC voted on April 3, 1987 
[SEC, 1987], to propose rules requir­
ing all independent auditors of com­
panies reporting to the SEC to under­
go a peer review covering their ac­
counting and auditing practices. The 
rules, if adopted, will be enforced by 
changing the SEC definition of “cer­
tified” as it relates to financial state­
ments. Financial statements includ­
ed in SEC filings will be certified
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only if the auditor who examines 
them has met the peer review require­
ments and has a quality control sys­
tem which is sufficient to reasonably 
ensure compliance with generally 
accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS).
The SEC uses enhanced audit 
quality as the primary justification 
for the proposal for mandatory peer 
review. Although peer review will 
not prevent unusual breakdowns of 
quality control, it may reinforce the 
accountant’s commitment to main­
taining good quality control. The 
SEC’s regulations affecting the pub­
lic accountants who audit registrants 
are intended to ensure that those 
accountants accept the high level of 
responsibility owed to the public 
and perform their work with the 
rigorous quality standards expected 
in SEC practice. The SEC takes the 
position that peer review helps deter­
mine whether an accountant’s work 
conforms to these high professional 
standards. And assuming that peer 
review improves audit quality, the 
SEC believes peer review will in­
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Two sources for obtaining a peer 
review are set forth in the proposal. 
One such source is a person, team 
or firm, hired by the firm to be 
reviewed. In this case, the peer re­
view will be overseen by the SEC. 
The second source for a peer review 
is one performed under the author­
ity of a peer review organization 
(PRO). For a PRO to be “qualified,” 
it must meet numerous specifica­
tions, and all PROs will be overseen 
by the SEC. For either approach to a 
peer review, the SEC has proposed 
various standards and transition peri­
od guidelines.
The activities described by the 
SEC for a peer review are basically 
the same as those currently con­
ducted in a SECPS peer review. A 
review of the quality control system 
and a substantive examination of 
engagement files are both required. 
One issue, on which the SEC directly 
requested comment, is whether all 
contested audits, that is, those for 
which there has been an allegation 
that GAAS was not followed, should 
be mandatorily included in the sam­
ple of engagement files examined. 
The reason for including contested 
audits is that the examination of the 
files may provide information to the 
auditor that will help in doing future 
audits. If contested audits are always 
included in peer reviews, the risk is 
that the peer review workpapers, 
which are normally confidential docu­
ments, may become public informa­
tion through court evidence and tes­
timony.
The proposed reporting proce­
dures are also similar to a SECPS 
peer review. A peer review report 
and letter of comments must be 
issued by the reviewer. The letter of 
comments will include anything that 
produces a “more than remote” pos­
sibility that GAAS have not or will 
not be complied with. The reviewed 
accountant must respond to the com­
ments letter in writing. The report, 
the letter of comments and the re­
sponse will be available to the public 
and will also be filed with the SEC. A 
major change in the required report­
ing will be the addition of a new 
responsibility for the PRO. The PRO 
must determine whether the re­
viewed firm’s response indicates ac­
tion, or planned action, that is appro­
priate for the deficiencies cited by 
the reviewer. If the firm’s response is 
not appropriate for the cited defi­
ciencies, the PRO must report this 
conclusion to the SEC. A reviewed 
firm that responds inadequately to 
suggestions for improvement could 
find itself the subject of SEC scru­
tiny, the result of which may be SEC 
refusal to accept financial state­
ments audited by that firm.
As in all suggested “improve­
ments” for the accounting profes­
sion, the SEC proposal has the poten­
tial for creating problems. The first 
of these is a reduction of competi­
tion. A large percentage of the CPA 
firms currently auditing SEC regis­
trants are already members of the 
SECPS. For these firms, the adop­
tion of the proposed rules will have 
little significance. However, opinions 
vary on the impact the rules may 
have for audit firms already having 
SEC practices but not undergoing 
peer review and for those firms wish­
ing to expand their audit practices to 
include SEC clients. These firms will 
have to decide whether or not they 
are willing to enter into a peer review 
process. If they elect to accept the 
peer review requirement, there will 
be an economic cost,which may af­
fect their competitive positions. If 
they reject the prospect of undergo­
ing peer review, they will also be 
rejecting the population of SEC reg­
istrants as potential audit clients.
There are several responses to the 
concern about reducing competi­
tion. One is that most firms auditing 
SEC registrants are already mem­
bers of the SECPS so the impact will 
be small. A second is that if a firm is 
not wiling to undergo a peer review, 
it should not be accepting SEC cli­
ents. This second response is based 
on the idea that when a firm is audit­
ing SEC registrants, it is in the “big 
leagues”and must accept the respon­
sibilities that accompany such activ­
ity. One of these responsibilities is 
to confirm that its accounting and 
auditing practice is governed by an 
adequate quality control system. To 
the SEC, the need for quality control 
and the willingness of an account­
ing firm to prove that it possesses 
good quality control seem to out­
weigh the possibility of limiting com­
petition. There was, however, a re­
quest for comments on the possibili­
ty of damage to competition. The 
SEC’s current stance mirrors a shift 
in concern; the Congressional inves­
tigations of the 1970s were very 
concerned about the Big-Eight firms’ 
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dominance of the industry whereas 
the intense concern now is ensuring 
quality audits.
Another anticipated complaint 
about the SEC proposal is the eco­
nomic burden that mandatory peer 
review will bring. As can be expect­
ed, the main issue is the cost it will 
impose on smaller firms. Various 
estimates of average peer review 
costs are presented in the proposal, 
but at this point, the impact of the 
costs is unknown. Costs clearly re­
late to the competition issue. They 
also relate to the competency issue 
because the more quality control 
problems an audit firm has, the high­
er its peer review costs are likely to 
be. At the core of the concern is the 
belief that small firms may be faced 
with what they perceive to be exces­
sive new costs, from not only the 
actual peer review fee, but also the 
preparation required for the peer 
review.
The SEC does not contest that 
there will be new costs incurred 
when firms that have not been peer 
reviewed in the past enter into such 
a program. Its position, though, is 
that the actual peer review fee should 
be the only new cost. Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 25 
requires that appropriate quality con­
trol standards be in place to reason­
ably ensure that GAAS is followed. 
The SEC suggests that a CPA firm 
cannot meet the requirements of 
SAS No. 25 without having docu­
mentation of its quality control stan­
dards and an internal system for 
monitoring compliance with those 
standards. In other words, if a firm is 
already complying with GAAS, the 
only new requirement and cost im­
posed by mandatory peer review is 
the review itself. The implication is 
that if a firm is not already meeting 
the requirements of SAS No. 25 by 
formally assessing quality control 
issues, it should not be auditing SEC 
registrants. The opposing position 
is that a firm can meet the require­
ments of SAS No. 25 without having 
a written description of its quality 
control procedures or a formal in­
ternal monitoring system and that 
the development of these prior to 
undergoing an initial peer review 
can be very expensive. Although it 
appears clear that the SEC does not 
believe the proposed requirement 
will be excessively costly, direct com­
ments on cost were requested.
Credibility is added to the greater 
concern for quality than for reduced 
competition and increased cost by 
the result of staff studies the SEC 
performed. The SEC’s staff analyzed 
enforcement actions brought by the 
SEC between 1981 and 1986. A major­
ity of these actions were brought 
against accounting firms which had 
not had a peer review at the time the 
problem audit arose. The actions 
brought against firms which had 
undergone peer review most fre­
quently resulted from the handling 
of very complex transactions, rather 
than the general ways in which the 
audits were conducted. This might 
suggest that firms that are peer re­
viewed conduct higher quality au­
dits. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that large firms undergo 
peer review more often than do small 
firms. Thus, an alternative conclu­
sion is that larger firms may be able 
to conduct higher quality audits on 
SEC registrants as a result of being 
more experienced in auditing SEC 
clients. The SEC asked for com­
ments on the two possible conclu­
sions. A mandatory peer review re­
quirement might lead to better quali­
ty control for smaller firms, thus 
leading to better quality audits. Alter­
natively, if size and experience are 
the real causes for fewer enforce­
ment actions, then requiring peer 
review of smaller firms will not im­
prove the situation at all. Further, in 
the latter case, if a peer review require­
ment makes the smaller firms less 
able to compete, then peer review 
may reduce small firms’ ability to get 
experience and to grow, and thus to 
improve their audit quality.
A final major controversy on this 
proposed peer review requirement 
deals with CPA firms and clients 
which “grow up” together. Small 
CPA firms often comment on the 
inequity of a system which causes 
their best audit clients to change 
auditors as they plan a public offer­
ing because the clients believe Big- 
Eight audits carry greater credibil­
ity. It may be that the SEC proposal 
will exacerbate this situation. Assum­
ing a CPA firm has not previously 
been peer reviewed, it must deal 
with beginning the process. And 
although entering the program might 
prove costly, the CPA firm must 
maintain a pricing structure that will 
encourage the client not to change 
auditors. Clients themselves may be 
burdened if they wish to stay with 
their current auditor but are forced 
to change because the firm refuses 
to be peer reviewed.
Aside from the question of whether 
mandatory peer review will have 
good or bad results, there is also the 
question of whether such a require­
ment is really necessary. A sugges­
tion was previously considered, and 
then dropped, of requiring disclo­
sure in SEC filing documents of 
whether a company’s auditor has 
undergone peer review. The logic 
behind this suggestion is that if peer 
review is beneficial, clients will con­
sider it as a major criterion in select­
ing auditors. The market, if informed, 
may determine the desirability of 
peer review.  
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